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       FORUM   
 Everyday life in Nazi Germany               
 At a conference in 2007 in his honour at the University of  Michigan, Alf  Lüdtke 
commented that there are many different ways to research the history of  everyday life: its 
practitioners are still more united by the questions they ask than by how they seek their 
answers. Its pluralism, and its marginality, has allowed  Alltagsgeschichte to serve as a conduit 
for epistemological innovation into modern German history from other fields, such as 
the linguistic, postmodern, cultural and spatial turns. Yet the characteristically  eigensinnig 
lack of  consensus can make it challenging for individual scholars to explain precisely 
what they mean by  Alltagsgeschichte to their readers. 
 In this issue,  German History is pleased to bring together an international panel of  
distinguished historians who are either practitioners of   Alltagsgeschichte or whose 
scholarship has been significantly influenced by it:  Elissa Mailänder Koslov 
(Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut Essen),  Gideon Reuveni (University of  Melbourne), 
 Paul Steege (Villanova University), and  Dennis Sweeney (University of  Alberta). 
Since the 1960s, historians of  everyday life have investigated many different periods of  
German history, but none so much as the Nazi era. It seems fitting then to focus this  Forum 
on the brown elephant in the room. The contributors have been asked to think about 
how the history of  everyday life has altered our interpretations of  the Third Reich in 
particular and modern German history more broadly. But rather than starting with a 
framing question from the moderator, we begin instead with the sceptical doubts of  a 
panellist. It would hardly be a Forum on  Alltagsgeschichte without unruly acts of  
reappropriation.  Andrew Stuart Bergerson (University of  Missouri – Kansas City) 
moderates the discussion. 
 Reuveni: The very notion that one should even consider (re)defining the practice of  
 Alltagsgeschichte so provokes me. It reminds me of  a satirical history textbook that has since 
become a British cultural icon:  1066 and All That . It divides English history into two parts: 
from the Roman conquest of  England to 1914, which is considered  ‘ a good thing ’ , and 
the period thereafter, when the United States emerged as a superpower and  ‘ history 
came to a  . . . . ’ As these humourists explain in their  ‘ compulsory ’ preface, real history is 
what you remember.  ‘ All other history defeats itself. ’ 
 This approach to history is much more common than some of  us would like to admit, 
and German history is no exception. In the  ‘ 1933 and all that ’ approach, the contrast 
between the Germany of  poets and philosophers and the Germany of  judges and 
murderers became the yardstick by which modern Germany and its history came to be 
examined and judged. Divided into pre- and post-Third Reich, this way of  framing 
German history made the Nazi period into its zenith or nadir. To be sure,  Alltagsgeschichte 
attempted  sotto voce to undermine the  Sonderweg theory as the dominant interpretative 
framework of  modern German history. But what made  Alltagsgeschichte attractive to its 
practitioners became an object of  derision by mainstream historians: its fragmented and 
de-centred perspective on the ordinary as well as its emphasis on practice in place of  an 
overarching narrative.  Alltagsgeschichte was perceived as a kind of  history that defeats itself. 
 The so-called  Historikerstreit did hinder conservative historians, led by Ernst Nolte, 
from turning the brown elephant in the room to a little brownish mouse. In part thanks to 
 Alltagsgeschichte , professional historians are now expected to seek ways critically to 
historicize the past without challenging the memory of  the horrors of  National Socialism. 
The history of  everyday life now appears an attractive option that offers historians of  
various political convictions a way to confront the past without falling prey to simple 
dichotomous thinking. But it is still an open question to what extent  Alltagsgeschichte springs 
out of — or contributes to — the big story of   ‘ 1933 and all that ’ or even an alternative 
metanarrative for modern German history. That is, I wonder if  the history of  everyday 
life is a mere expansion of  our knowledge about the past, or whether it can offer another 
way, hopefully no less memorable, to conceptualize modern German history. 
 Bergerson: I think the place where historians of  everyday life have already accomplished 
the most in this regard is in terms of  rethinking the nature of  the historical subject. Over 
the years, modern German historians have depicted ordinary Germans in many different 
ways: as both unruly and obedient, coerced and coercing, implementing orders and 
improvising new solutions, sometimes anticipating public policies, and at other times 
simply responding to them. My first question to the panel is: 
 1. Could each of  you comment on how  Alltagsgeschichte has encouraged
you to rethink the agency of  ordinary Germans? 
 Sweeney: The promise of   Alltagsgeschichte for me has always been related to its insistence 
on exploring the subtleties and complexities of  human agency. I understand agency as 
the capacity of  historical actors to act creatively and efficaciously in and on their 
immediate social worlds. In this regard, Alf  Lüdtke’s version of   Eigensinn has been the 
most fruitful. It explored willful acts of  self-distancing that allowed  ‘ ordinary people ’ 
( kleine Leute ) to forge autonomies at the workplace, in social and leisure time activities, in 
the local neighbourhood and on city streets, from the Imperial era to the eras of  Nazism 
and following World War Two. The value of  this definition of  agency for me was 
threefold. First, it offered a way of  exploring how ordinary historical actors partially 
recreated and reappropriated their conditions of  work and social life without assuming 
that they were engaged in fully-articulated, calculated actions or operating on the basis 
of  fully-developed subjectivities. Second, it facilitated discussion of  the capacity of  
ordinary people to shape — at least in part — their own immediate worlds without 
romanticizing forms of  popular agency, for instance, by assigning them progressive 
political valences. And third, it allowed us to trace the gap between the often formulaic 
appeals of  social organizations and political parties, on the one hand, and the apparent 
needs and desires of  ordinary people, especially industrial workers, on the other. Alf  
Lüdtke was concerned as much to demonstrate the distance of  industrial workers from 
the Social Democratic Party during the  Kaiserreich as he was to identify the support, 
however unwilling or indirect, that workers lent to the Nazi regime during the 1930s and 
1940s. He showed us how to think in fascinating new ways about the indeterminate 
political-ideological valences of   Eigensinn . 
 Steege: For me,  Eigensinn serves not only to describe how  ‘ little people ’ create liberating 
spaces for independent agency but also, in somewhat less optimistic terms, how their acts 
of  independence work to articulate and reinforce structures of  hegemony. Far from 
asserting a single answer to questions about Germans ’ individual or collective guilt and 
innocence,  Alltagsgeschichte offers one way to integrate arguments about different layers of  
personal responsibility in and for Nazi rule. The historiography has perhaps moved 
beyond the crudest intentionalist-functionalist debates about Nazi-directed genocide, 
but, as Peter Fritzsche recently argued in the  Journal of  Modern History , historians still need 
to find ways to move back and forth between ideological visions articulated in Berlin; 
local, but mass, practices of  violence, whether in the German capital or on the Eastern 
Front; and individuals ’ choices to watch, participate, muddle through, resist, or some 
combination of  the above.  Alltagsgeschichte embraces the shades of  grey implicit in this 
mode of  questioning for which there are more than two — black or white — answers. It 
offers a vision of  human agency that is at once broad and narrow. While acknowledging 
how structures of  power, and the people who inhabit them, can limit the room for 
manoeuvre available to individual actors, it also leaves room for their mutual complicity 
in producing those same structures of  power. This is why the historian of  everyday life 
looks to stories of  collaboration and resistance. The fact that they are often the same 
stories is precisely the point. 
 Mailänder Koslov: For me, everyday life is both an analytical concept and a 
methodological approach that relates experience to agency. Nazi  ‘ executioners ’ are a 
case in point; their violence offers historians a particularly important juncture from 
which to understand the relationship between the Nazi regime and its ordinary agents. 
Most theoretical and historical studies treat the violence of  Nazi perpetrators as a logical 
consequence of  three major factors: Nazi ideology (antisemitism, anti-Bolshevism and 
so on), the quest for  Lebensraum , and the institutional setting of  genocide. But if  Nazi 
policies are necessary conditions for historians to account for the massive destruction 
and annihilation, they are not a sufficient explanation for what I call  concentrational and 
genocidal violence . The executors of  these forms of  violence were not born experts of  terror. 
They became violent — or rather, they made themselves into perpetrators — in very 
specific institutional and socio-cultural settings: for instance, concentration and 
extermination camps that were, for them, also workplaces and living environments. A 
focus on the everyday allows historians to reconstruct how individuals appropriate 
norms, discourses and practices in order to position themselves in wider socio-political 
landscapes. 
 Reuveni: In my view, one of  the core features of   Alltagsgeschichte lies in this emphasis on 
meaning and consequently in the significance it ascribes to culture. While it would be 
misleading to imply that all historians of  everyday life are equally interested in culture, it 
would be fair to say that  Alltagsgeschichte , more than any other approach to modern 
German history, has paid careful attention to what occurs inside the minds of  ordinary 
people. The innovation of  this approach does not rest in the way it defines culture — a 
notoriously elusive concept — but rather in its call for a closer examination of  the means 
by which people endow the world with meaning, or what the Germans call  Sinngebung . 
 Alltagsgeschichte is not simply a new version of  the  histoire des mentalités ; what we have in 
 Alltagsgeschichte is an attempt to understand being as constituted by a continuing 
interaction with the world. In advancing a stimulating research agenda that acknowledges 
the full range of  human experience,  Alltagsgeschichte emphasizes that it is ordinary people 
who make human society and that they are not merely passive subjects of  abstract 
structures or powerful individuals. 
 Mailänder Koslov:  Alltagsgeschichte has taught me to interrogate the rules, practices, 
objects and spaces of  everyday life that the agents themselves do not question and, in the 
case of  the Third Reich, that even seem to have nothing to do with the violence of  
extermination. Practising  Alltagsgeschichte means taking nothing, even the trivial, for 
granted. Ethnographic in style, the history of  everyday life negotiates familiarity and 
strangeness in order to render the familiar alien and the alien familiar. In this, 
 Alltagsgeschichte is closely allied with sociology, psychology and especially anthropology. It 
does not matter if  our historical subjects are  ‘ the little people ’ or  ‘ the elites ’ . One could 
just as readily conduct an  Alltagsgeschichte of  Nazi institutions or leaders as ordinary 
Germans. Researching the history of  everyday life is not so much a matter of  who we 
chose as our historical subjects but how we interpret the situations in which they find 
themselves and their behaviour in those situations. Ordinary moments of  crystallization 
allow us to reconstruct the larger social relationships and cultural meanings — I prefer 
the term resonances ( Sinnzusammenhänge ) — relating to power and violence that otherwise 
would be overlooked. 
 Steege: The most telling insight I’ve gained from recent works of   Alltagsgeschichte has 
been their encouragement to read stories and histories differently. Rather than a school 
or even a circumscribed set of  topics or issues,  Alltagsgeschichte is better understood as a 
fluid assemblage of  ways of  doing history that offers questions rather than answers. It 
foregrounds the agency of  the reader and storyteller, and thus challenges him or her to 
make choices about how, and whether, to empathize or condemn — and thus to be aware 
of  and critique that process of  making choices. Although not conceived as  Alltagsgeschichte , 
Ruth Kluger’s intensely self-aware memoir,  Still Alive: A Holocaust Girlhood Remembered , 
makes explicit these layers of  agency as historical actor and as narrator of  that history. 
She questions and casts doubt on the motivations for her and others ’ actions in the past, 
but she also casts doubt on the words she commits to the page in the present. She demands 
of  herself  and of  her readers that they confront the need to make ethical judgments. In 
its effort to take human agency seriously in the past as in the present,  Alltagsgeschichte 
makes similar demands on the historian and her readers. 
 Reuveni: The problem of  reading is a good example of  how  Alltagsgeschichte can help us 
understand the agency of  ordinary people. Research on reading culture commonly 
displays reading as an acquired skill that does not simply reflect certain mindsets, but is 
also a powerful medium used to shape outlooks and influence readers ’ behaviours. Based 
on the approach that sees readers as victims of  what they were reading, scholars such as 
Anton Kaes or Rudolf  Schenda have argued that the popularity of  anti-democratic, 
nationalist and antisemitic writings paved the way for the Nazi Party’s rise to power. Yet 
other evidence shows that, in the 1920s, there was a wide dissemination of  publications 
light years away from these proto-fascist ideas. Was German society imbued with extreme 
nationalism and an antisemitic ideology that penetrated the society through the reading 
of  anti-democratic and racist literature? Or was German society instead more tolerant 
and open to the ways of  thinking disseminated through works of  literature and journalism 
emanating from authors and publishers with moderate and liberal positions? Part of  the 
problem here is the way we are thinking about the agency of  the reader. Is reading simply 
an acquired skill of  deciphering messages printed on paper, and the reader an empty self  
with no mind of  his own who is therefore in constant danger of  being manipulated? Or, 
should we instead regard reading as a creative activity itself  capable of  conveying 
meaning? Reading should not be viewed solely within the narrow framework of  the 
political, as if  institutional politics were the primary context for meaning and 
interpretation while reading. The act of  reading should be placed in a broader context in 
which the reader draws on an eclectic range of  social and everyday experiences to give 
meanings to the text, as I have shown in my study  Reading Germany . This approach restores 
the agency of  readers in historical analysis. 
 Bergerson: Your comments about reading bring us to my second question, which I ask 
in the light of  new scholarship on the violent side of  National Socialism — its antisemitism, 
Gestapo tactics,  Einsatzgruppen , concentration camps, plans for war, and so on. 
 2. How might we understand the role of  ordinary Germans in the
production, distribution and reception of   ‘ knowledge ’ in everyday life? 
 Sweeney: Knowledge of  the regime’s policies can neither be conceived in isolation 
from the propaganda and mass spectacles of  the agents of  the Nazi regime, nor can we 
imagine that we treat them exhaustively by studying the coercively regulated public 
sphere under German fascism. A more differentiated account of  state and society would 
suggest that the Nazi public sphere, in its official and unofficial dimensions, did not 
produce a singular body of  knowledge about the regime and its violent policies that could 
lead to consensus in any straightforward manner. The widespread attempt to mobilize 
the German people, taken together with a wide range of  strategic responses on the part 
of  ordinary Germans, from avid collaboration to many forms of  non-conformity, suggest 
that nearly all Germans knew about Nazi terror; but they produced that knowledge 
about terror in circuits of  everyday communication that were never autonomous, 
coherent, equal or simply two-way. 
 Reuveni: Moving the historical gaze from the collective guilt of  Germany to the 
knowledge of  actual Germans transforms the everyday into a site through which we can 
examine the full scope and depth of  meaning of  the Nazi project. It is by now well 
established that ample information on various aspects of  the Nazi policies and practices 
of  victimization was widespread among the general public. Depending on the time 
period and proximity to the sites of  violence, this information varied in its extent and 
accuracy. Thus some might have possessed more details than others. But the matter is 
not exhausted by determining that information was available and was circulated through 
a variety of  channels among ordinary Germans. The receiving and transmitting of  such 
information could be an indication of  conformity with the regime and its policies. At the 
same time, it could also be read as indicating an unwillingness to embrace, or even 
discontent with a system that became exceedingly violent. In order fully to assess the 
meaning of  this awareness we still need to learn more about how this information was 
received and internalized. Not only does this highly complex endeavour require an 
examination of  the processes by which information becomes knowledge, but it also 
invites us to reflect on how and by whom this knowledge was translated, if  at all, into 
concrete action. 
 Mailänder Koslov: That is the place to start the analysis, in my opinion; the knowledge 
of  Nazi crimes begins in everyday habits and experiences. The German women working 
in the Nazi East, portrayed with such nuance by Elizabeth Harvey, assisted in the 
expulsion of  the Poles, visited ghettos and gave testimony about the disastrous conditions; 
but all they saw were dirty, strange, and uncanny people. What they  ‘ knew ’ about their 
victims was formed by how they interacted with them. In the case of  perpetrators, their 
knowledge began with their daily labours: the expulsion, persecution and extermination 
of  European Jews and other target groups. The complex work of  mass murder, for 
instance, involved a multitude of  actors and was divided into different steps: selecting 
people to kill; killing by injections, gas or shooting; dealing with the corpses; and so on. 
Even those who were not directly implicated in the extermination process could see, 
hear, and smell it during their day-to-day labour. Their ambition to  ‘ do a good job ’ 
inspired and justified the work of  actual extermination as well as the many support 
activities also necessary for keeping the extermination process running. Perpetrators 
were able to fulfill their work obligations over the course of  years by conceiving of  their 
labours as the  ‘ ultimate fulfillment of  German quality work ’ , to quote Alf  Lüdtke. There 
is no doubt that this peculiar way of  framing extermination was brought home after 
work. Gudrun Schwarz has shown that spouses helped executioners carry out their 
 ‘ difficult ’ task — on the ground in the camps as at home in the  Reich — by supporting them 
emotionally and rationally in this way of  thinking about their labours. My point is that 
 ‘ doing a good and hard job ’ framed the way these crimes were  ‘ known ’ , initially in terms 
of  social relations among camp guards, well before this was communicated to Germans 
in the homeland. That is, a complicated process of  knowledge and ignorance of  these 
crimes was built right into the everyday process of  extermination. What they saw and did 
made perfect sense, on the ground in the camps as well as at home in the  Reich , once we 
frame their  ‘ knowledge ’ in terms of  their everyday lives and work. 
 Steege: Even independent of  a discussion of  their roles as perpetrators, the assertion 
that ordinary Germans knew nothing or very little about the violence at the centre of  
Nazi Germany has been refuted, not least by the many photographs that capture 
ordinary people  watching acts of  violence — snapshots of  German police humiliating the 
Jews they are  ‘ clearing ’ from towns of  eastern Poland or police photos of  spectators 
watching the execution of  forced labourers in Cologne, for instance. Of  course watching 
and seeing are not the same. Ruth Kluger describes how, after she escaped from the Nazi 
camp system and assumed the identity of  a non-Jewish German girl, she encountered a 
group of  concentration-camp prisoners in the Bavarian town where she had taken refuge 
with her mother and  ‘ sister ’ . When the Americans arrived a few days later, none of  the 
townsfolk had seen a thing. At least they had not perceived what they were physically 
seeing. Victor Klemperer offers a similar account in his diaries of  how a Nazi official was 
blissfully unaware of  the fact that in April 1942 Jews were for the most part not permitted 
to take the tram in Dresden. By carefully parsing  ‘ looking ’ from  ‘ seeing ’ in our analysis, 
the history of  everyday life suggests one way to confront knowing as an undertaking 
rather than a condition. 
 Sweeney: Consider in this regard Michael Wildt’s excellent recent book on antisemitic 
violence during the 1930s,  Volksgemeinschaft als Selbstermächtigung . As Elissa Mailänder 
Koslov suggests, he begins with the violent actions themselves. He focuses on the 
extraordinarily widespread everyday acts of  violence directed at German Jews,  ‘ actions ’ 
that were concentrated in smaller towns and villages across Germany: progrom-like 
attacks on persons, homes and synagogues, often preceded by highly ritualized roundups 
and marches through town during which Jews were humiliated and beaten. He argues 
that the members of  Nazi organizations invoked this violence , but they also created all 
kinds of  opportunities for  ‘ bystanders ’ to participate by either joining in or offering 
approval to the actions. The crucial media of  communication were announcements in 
local newspapers, leaflets posted throughout the town, notices placed in town display 
cases — the notorious  Stürmer-Kasten — and accusations and rumours circulated by activists 
by word of  mouth in ways that allowed other townspeople to participate in the events. 
Pre-existing channels of  small-town or neighbourhood communication were vital to this 
activity, but just as important were the ways in which activists in the Nazi movement 
recreated them, inserted themselves into them, and quite self-consciously colonized 
them. 
 Bergerson: Who colonized whom, and how precisely, seems to me to be one of  the 
main areas in which modern German historians still disagree the most. Some use 
categories such as perpetrators, bystanders and victims to label ordinary Germans in 
terms of  degrees of  ideological penetration  ‘ from above ’ . Others account for nazification 
 ‘ from below ’ by focusing on interpersonal interactions such as denunciations, parades, 
protests, symbols and violence. 
 3. In, or extrapolating from, the Nazi case, how might we reframe the
problem of   ‘ politicization ’ more productively? 
 Sweeney: Here I would like to register my disagreement with the direction of  much 
recent work on the Nazi period. I accept the arguments that the Nazis left no corner of  
German society untouched by their all-encompassing ideological reach and their brutal 
interventions, and that large numbers of  Germans willingly supported the Nazi 
leadership. But I dispute the now pervasive and increasingly undifferentiated claims 
about a general consensus in favour of  Hitler and the Nazi regime. Several studies 
(Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Gerhard Paul, for example) ignore, sideline or explicitly 
discount the role played by Nazi and Gestapo-inspired terror, violence, intimidation and 
pressures in everyday life, even around issues as mundane as expectations of  the  Heil 
Hitler greeting or Winter Aid collections. Not only does this scholarship fail to address the 
specific, differential workings of  political violence — its targeting of  social, political and 
racial enemies or outsiders — in the ways that Eric Johnson’s work has so convincingly 
explored, it also fails to consider, as Tim Mason suggested in his essays on workers, the 
structural interrelations between the different mechanisms of  repression, neutralization 
and integration that brought Germans into varying levels of  participation in the Nazi 
 Volksgemeinschaft . This interpretation obscures what I regard as the central dynamics of  
fascism as a terrorist movement and regime: the relentless mobilization of  supporters on 
behalf  of  their aims and against their enemies, in peace and war, and with all of  the 
intimidation, threats, and pressures that this entailed. 
 Reuveni: To me, the question of  whether the nazification of  everyday life was forced 
from above or cultivated from below represents a binary system of  thinking that is 
preoccupied with the attempt to refute or establish the nexus between the ordinary 
German and National Socialism. But the greatest strength of   Alltagsgeschichte lies in the 
way it insists upon ambiguity and ambivalence. These considerations provide for a more 
nuanced and meticulous reading of  agency in complex historical situations. Ambiguity 
and ambivalence allow historians the possibility of  moving beyond the traditional 
dichotomies that still dominate the common perception of  life under National Socialism 
such as submission and opposition, or improvization and planning. By acknowledging 
the ambiguity of  historical representation and the ambivalence of  human experience, 
 Alltagsgeschichte offers the historian much more room to account for the multilayered 
quality of  human experience and the courses of  historical time. 
 Steege: Sebastian Haffner’s self-critical memoir presents this kind of  challenge to 
personal and chronological dividing lines. He describes his response to SA-men who 
confronted him in March 1933 in a library in Berlin’s  Kammergericht and asked whether he 
was an Aryan. He answered affirmatively but later recognized this response as an indirect 
validation of  the question.  Alltagsgeschichte offers one way to engage this ambiguity: how 
the decisively anti-Nazi Haffner might nonetheless be implicated in the nazification of  
daily life — here, the ejection of  Jews from a Berlin library. Central to this way of  
interpreting these kinds of  ironies in everyday life is  Eigensinn : that fluid and almost 
untranslatable coinage that articulates both the liberating possibilities of  stubborn 
independence in the midst of  daily life and the often unintentional complicity in 
producing and sustaining the structures of   Herrschaft .  Alltagsgeschichte endeavours to make 
that simultaneity and contradiction apparent in the narratives it crafts. 
 Reuveni: Or consider the case of  typography, an area that we would normally not 
immediately associate with politics. Debates about which typeface — Fraktur or 
Antiqua — constituted the real German letter were embedded in political debates on the 
nature of  German-ness, the relationship between Germany and the other nations, and 
on other political issues of  the time. Prior to 1933, the Nazis had made a point of  only 
using Fraktur in their publications, but thereafter, they standardized Fraktur as the 
German national typeface: all official publications, newspapers, and textbooks were 
required to use it. This decision, however, did not eradicate the use of  rounded typefaces 
of  Antiqua. In the 1930s we find abundant use of  those fonts in books, magazines and 
advertisements. Whether National Socialism was unwilling or unable to eliminate 
Antiqua is an interesting question, but this issue indicates that life in the Third Reich was 
much more flexible and offered more space to manoeuvre than the image of  
totalitarianism allows. The Nazis finally reversed their position on 3 January 1941. While 
Germany was still at the pinnacle of  its power, Hitler’s Chancellery stipulated that 
Fraktur was in reality a version of  Jewish characters which had invaded the German 
language via the Jewish newspapers and print, and that Antiqua was the true German 
type. This example suggests to me that, in addition to exploring the changing meaning 
of  the political and how it limited or enhanced the space of  people to act, historians of  
everyday life should also ask why under certain circumstances politics — in the narrow 
sense of  the term — becomes so imperative. Comparing and contrasting the Third Reich 
to other regimes might deepen our understanding of  human agency under extreme 
conditions while also providing a more sober approach to some of  the myths about daily 
life during the Third Reich. 
 Mailänder Koslov: We might also ask how highly political acts can be experienced 
in apparently ordinary ways. Take for instance the transfer of  camp guards from the 
greater  Reich to concentration camps located in the so-called  Generalgouvernement . The Nazis 
treated the General Government, called the  ‘ Far East ’ of  the German empire, like a 
foreign land, separated by a currency, customs and an administrative frontier. It was also 
the ideologically charged site of  the Third Reich’s  Lebensraum policy where the Nazi 
regime ruthlessly implemented radical antisemitism and antislavism. But did they 
experience this involvement in this major policy initiative as a politicization of  their 
everyday life? For instance, almost all of  the former guards in the concentration and 
extermination camp of  Majdanek recalled their stay as an imposition. This explanation 
of  events was a way to excuse their collaboration, but it also reflected their actual 
experience of  moving to this foreign-seeming place. For them Majdanek was a chaotic 
place when contrasted with the better organized camps in the  Reich . The climate was 
unfamiliar as were the Spartan living conditions. Where they were used to sharing a 
common language and culture with the prisoners in the camps in the  Reich , the guards 
were confronted in the General Government with people predominantly from Eastern 
Europe who only occasionally spoke German. All this caused frustration, fear, and anger. 
Suddenly the abstract racist propaganda of  the Nazi regime regarding dirty and disease-
ridden  ‘ Jews ’ and  ‘ Slavs ’ made perfect sense in their eyes. In this case, the camp guards 
were not remade into executioners by the Nazi regime per se; rather it was the actual 
experience of  moving into this foreign and threatening context that provided the impetus 
for an escalation of  terror and violence. 
 Steege: This is why I dislike the term  ‘ politicization ’ . To my mind, it suggests too much a 
sense that politics comes from outside. One of   Alltagsgeschichte ’ s real accomplishments 
rests in its ability to imbricate the contestations for power within everyday life. Insofar as 
 Alltagsgeschichte is ultimately a history of  practices, albeit one that also wrestles with their 
meanings, the degree to which ideologies saturate everyday life seems less critical than 
the extent to which the activities of  everyday life help constitute hegemonic structures. If  
we locate nazification within daily practices, it does not depend on the Nazi state or, for 
that matter, only on Nazis. By focusing on practices — of  violence, sociability, inclusion 
and exclusion — several recent works on the Weimar Republic by Drew Bergerson and 
Pamela Swett locate the deeply personal processes of  the Nazi revolution already before 
1933. The histories they tell are less about people  becoming Nazis than about  doing in a 
Nazi way, even before 1933. 
 Sweeney: Like Paul Steege, I don’t find the term  ‘ politicization ’ very useful because it 
suggests that we can identify social practices or domains innocent of  power. I think that 
this sort of  perspective runs the risk of  overlooking central aspects of  National Socialism: 
namely, the way the Nazi movement was able to build upon the everyday discontents of  
radical right political activists in the 1920s and its extraordinary capacity as a regime to 
draw on, and open up spaces for, the everyday energies of  its constituencies during the 
Third Reich. We now have interesting studies of  everyday life during the Third Reich 
that point to the ways in which the regime’s leaders could count on ordinary Germans 
inadvertently to serve the interests of  Nazism. We also have excellent studies of  the ways 
in which Nazis and their supporters reaccented and recolonized already politically 
cathected everyday experiences: from activity in social clubs (Peter Fritzsche), to leisure 
and entertainment venues (Eric Rentschler and Shelley Baranowski) to the brutal 
treatment of  the homeless (Wolfgang Ayaß). At this point, we need to think more about 
how the Nazis both deliberately targeted everyday life and were able to mobilize their 
own supporters in ways that opened up possibilities for ideological collaboration for  non -
supporters. As Peter Fritzsche argues in his new book, when it came to racial policy, the 
regime deliberately, in the words of  one official, strove to  ‘ shake Germans out of  the 
 “ quiet of  everyday life ” . ’ The leaders of  the regime and their grass-roots activists set out 
to do this by means of  mobilizing support via numerous pedagogical initiatives —
 especially the  Gemeinschaftslager — media spectacles, orchestrated exhibitions and violent 
incursions. But they did so in part self-consciously, both in everyday life and through 
institutions of  the public sphere and state. 
 Steege: Yet Alf  Lüdtke and Michael Wildt have both cautioned against relegating the 
political to the state alone. Rather than looking for connections between daily life and 
political or state affairs, they see politics and the political as part and parcel of  everyday 
life practices. In the famous example offered by Alf  Lüdtke, the policy and practice of  
the Holocaust becomes decipherable in the ordinary coffee break in the Göttingen office 
of  the Gestapo. The point here is not that the coffee break has been  ‘ politicized ’ or even 
 ‘ nazified ’ but rather the much more unsettling proposition that something as innocuous 
as people gathering for a cup of  coffee can  ‘ work ’ in Nazi terms, or more precisely: that 
its practitioners can make it work that way. Here Nazism is not an exotic import but part 
of  the relational  ‘ furniture ’ that the people in the office arrange to fit comfortably within 
their personal and work regimes. 
 Mailänder Koslov: This is just what happened in Majdanek. The German SS 
personnel did not feel that living in the General Government was a totally negative 
experience. Their job as camp guard had already meant upward social mobility for most 
of  them thanks to their stable income and status as a functionary of  the Reich. 
Reassignment to the East involved yet another step up on the social ladder because the 
imperial Germans were able, once they adjusted to their shock upon arrival, to assume a 
position of  authority vis-à-vis the Jews, Poles and even the indigenous ethnic Germans 
both in the camp and on the streets of  Lublin. In this colonial context, German women 
even gave orders and issued instructions to Polish men. Elizabeth Harvey speaks about 
 ‘ instilling  Herrenbewußtsein ’ in those women who served as settlement instructors and 
teachers in the annexed and occupied portions of  Poland. The point is that the colonists 
of  the so-called  ‘ German East ’ did not simply reproduce labels diffused by propaganda 
or preexisting in popular culture, as David Furber and Jürgen Zimmerer have argued. 
Rather, they helped implement the Nazi social imaginary in everyday life by appropriating 
these labels and attitudes for themselves. 
 Bergerson: What I find compelling about the way the four of  you are describing 
 Alltagsgeschichte is that you are reinterpreting passive ways of  being as active forms of  
doing — and then very carefully considering just how these everyday practices relate to 
larger systems of  meaning, power and violence. This approach cuts across the traditional 
definitions of  state and society that have shaped German historiography for many 
decades. Among microhistorians this approach almost becomes an article of  faith: that 
ordinary people make their own history in spite of  being constrained by circumstances 
not of  their choosing — or better, precisely because of  those constraints. But some 
historians, working in the tradition of  local history, still prefer to view ordinary Germans, 
and their everyday lives, as the objects of  broader historical forces, the most important of  
which was of  course the Nazi regime itself. 
 4. How do you make these interpretative leaps: between the realm of
ordinary experience and history writ large? 
 Sweeney: This is an excellent question, I think, because it gets to the heart of  the kinds 
of  theoretical and interpretative discussions from which  Alltagsgeschichte can benefit. 
Historians of  everyday life have been concerned with exploring the local and immediate 
circumstances of  individuals, especially their needs and concerns that are thought to lie 
beyond ideology or formal politics. This has unfortunately led to a focus on self-
determined acts of   Eigensinn in relation to originary quotidian needs. Even if  it is not 
what most of  these scholars intend, it has reinforced what I see as an anti-institutional or 
anti-structural bent in many histories of  everyday life. My criticism of  this approach is 
that it tends to overlook the degree to which most individuals are embedded in a wide 
array of  social institutions and political organizations up to and including public 
authorities such as parties, the state and so on. In the recent essay by Paul Steege, Drew 
Bergerson, Maureen Healy and Pamela Swett, this critique has even gone so far as to 
suggest that some historians bring their abstract categories — class, state and so on — to 
their material, while historians of  everyday life avoid such distortions by focusing on the 
concrete (read: authentic) experience of  individuals. This problematic claim obscures 
the extent to which histories of  everyday life are every bit as indebted to analytical 
categories and theoretical claims or assumptions such as  Eigensinn ,  Herrschaft and their 
workings. And it also tends to treat anything that might lie beyond everyday life — such as 
the economy, the public sphere, the state or ideology — as more or less self-evident and 
coherent structures by default. The risk here lies in separating individuals out from wider 
social relationships and institutions in ways that make it more difficult to make those 
leaps suggested in the question. A more productive approach would be to recognize that 
these institutions or domains — like everyday life — were never free-standing entities but 
rather were themselves the complex, unstable and provisional historical outcomes of  
social practices and political events that were constitutively linked to the routines and 
arenas of  everyday life during the twentieth century. 
 Mailänder Koslov: At the same time we need to draw critical attention to the gap 
between official guidelines and everyday practices. The tension between orders coming 
from above and circumstances found below often leads to a possibility for agency on the 
part of  those working  ‘ on the ground ’ , especially when we discover multiple, conflicting 
levels of  social expectations. In the context of  the concentration and extermination 
camps, for instance, guards had two influences to balance: on the one hand, there were 
prohibitions of  violence handed down from the central camp administration in Berlin 
(the  Wirtschaftsverwaltungshauptamt and former  Inspektion der Konzentrationslager ), and on the 
other, mid-level instructions from camp commanders whose violent ideology was 
exacerbated by the practical problems they faced in their living and working environment. 
Their excessive cruelty derived not simply from their embedded position within these 
institutions and ideologies, however. While official guidelines explicitly prohibited any 
individual maltreatment of  the inmates, the SS personnel quite often used physical 
violence on the body of  camp inmates to negotiate complex hierarchies of  power with 
the members of  this camp society. From the perspective of  everyday life, the concentration 
camp appears not as a static institution but rather as a dynamic arena in which a variety 
of  agents negotiated norms for expected, violent behaviour. The guards appropriated 
official rules in everyday situations: enforcing, modifying and even creating new codes of  
behaviour. Investigating the microphysics of  power (Michel Foucault) helps us to 
understand the everyday foundations for violence and the Nazi racial  Herrschaft . 
 To be sure, the institutional setting matters as a structuring frame for violence, as 
Dennis Sweeney is arguing. But that structure is also a product of  these micro-social 
dynamics. Nobody denies the influence of  the designers and administrators of  the camps 
in Berlin who set up and organized the camp system. Yet the tendency in the literature 
since Christopher Browning has been to argue that this alone does not explain the 
efficient violence of  the camps as a system of  mass destruction. Indeed, senior 
administrators in Berlin considered the massive violence conducted individually but 
systematically by the guards to be both counter-productive, insofar as it created chaos 
where they wanted disciplined employees who killed when it was necessary and as 
ordered, and also productive, insofar as the obstinate violence in everyday life produced 
terror in both the camps and in the larger civil society. To privilege the agents on the 
ground and their social practices in our research does not mean that individual agency 
matters more than institutional factors. By changing the focal distance of  the lens and 
enlarging the ordinary objects of  observation, historians of  everyday life take seriously 
the contention that a social reality does not operate in the same way at all different levels 
of  observation and analysis. Jacques Revel compared it to the levels of  representation in 
cartography. By drawing attention to social experiences and lived realities,  Alltagsgeschichte 
allows us to see something more clearly that is otherwise blurred from view: the play of  
structures ( jeu de structures ) that help give them historical presence in everyday life. 1 
 Steege: The structures within which historians work are blurred too. In spite of  the fact 
that everyday life history has, in Alf  Lüdtke’s words, entered into the  ‘ ensemble of  the 
historical social sciences ’ , there remain, I think, significant strands of  uneasiness, or 
  1  ‘ Micro-analyses et construction du social ’ , in Jacques Revel (ed.),  Jeux d ’ échelles. La micro-analyse à l’expérience 
(Paris, 1996), pp. 15-36, here p. 19. 
perhaps more accurately, unsettledness with regard to  Alltagsgeschichte , evident even in this 
forum. This is not to claim for everyday life historians the status of  persecuted outliers in 
the profession but rather to acknowledge the awkwardness of  this way of  doing history. 
 Alltagsgeschichte is hard to place, and rightly so. Its practitioners cast their eyes first to 
material locations in which their subjects take up positions and then to the broader 
symbolic frameworks that claim to make sense of  the world. In my work, I am 
simultaneously on the streets and squares of  Berlin after World War II and in the Cold 
War. Historians need to take both constructions seriously even as we tease out how each 
helps to conceal individuals ’ involvement in the production of  the other. There may be a 
trace of  incoherence or incomprehension in our efforts to put these perspectives together, 
but acknowledging those gaps also serves to give us room for manoeuvre and points of  
friction to spark further analysis. 
 Reuveni: I support the use of  this approach to understand better what ordinary 
Germans did or did not want to know, and how they acted when faced with situations of  
extreme violence. But when the discussion turns to historical responsibility, I share 
Dennis Sweeney’s discomfort regarding the swiping claims about the willingness of  
ordinary Germans to be subordinated to the Nazi  Volksgemeinschaft . One of  the sources 
for such undifferentiated generalizations seems to me to go back to the problem of  
 Verstehen — that is, the quest for empathic or participatory understanding of  historical 
subjects — and thus the issue of  the relationship between history and morality. In my 
view, the two should be kept strictly apart even when dealing with this highly charged 
chapter of  German history. History deals with what people did, or thought they were 
doing, under certain circumstances, whereas morality is preoccupied with what they 
should have been doing. That is why understanding does not necessarily imply forgiving. 
 Bergerson: What do the rest of  you think of  Gideon Reuveni’s argument? As German 
historians, we all know that the way we frame the everyday is inextricably enmeshed in 
the politics of  German memory. It is practically impossible for a historian to study 
everyday life during the Third Reich without being confronted by the brown elephant in 
the room. The polemics of  responsibility shape our historical scholarship. 
 5. What do you think makes for a more responsible history of  the everyday: 
the inclusion or the exclusion of  ethical considerations from our analysis? 
 Mailänder Koslov: If  we take violence as an object of  study, we need to look closely at 
practices of  physical violence, which has of  course a taste of  voyeurism. But we cannot 
analyse and understand the phenomenon otherwise. Research on perpetrators began 
with the postwar trials where the executioners, who had not spoken publicly about their 
actions and experiences, were forced to do so. It is still closely linked to the juridical 
records that are an excellent source material; and it took the perpetrator research a long 
time to emancipate itself  from the guilt question and move to more anthropological and 
sociological questions. To be sure, dealing with behaviour and agency raises the question 
of  responsibility. But to understand how and why violence happened, I see no point in 
reintroducing ethical categories in the historical analysis. I try not to judge the 
perpetrators and the violent acts but let the reader draw his own conclusions; for me the 
crucial and most difficult question is: how can I accurately represent and analyse this 
violence and cruelty, and do I succeed? 
 Sweeney: I wouldn’t know how to separate morality, or what I prefer to call politics, 
from our histories in the way suggested by Gideon Reuveni and Elissa Mailänder Koslov. 
Even the most resolute antiquarianism is covertly informed by political intentions, which 
influence everything from research emphasis to the very claim to remain outside ethics 
or politics, and necessarily entails, however indirectly, ethical-political consequences. 
Moreover, if  we try to keep our politics out of  our histories in this way, we risk suppressing 
the politics of  our historical subjects, whose thoughts and actions evolved out of  their 
own contexts of  ethical and political choice, not the mute imperatives of  obedience and 
conformity or some unified field of  social action. I think any responsible history of  
everyday life, and any responsible history, must be informed by political concerns —
 concerns that are openly acknowledged and thus open to critique — and seek to 
understand the political choices facing historical subjects themselves. For me, 
 Alltagsgeschichte has always thrived on its ability to combine rigorous scholarly protocols 
with explicit political concerns, especially in studies of  ordinary people during the Third 
Reich. More than other approaches, it has opened up crucial perspectives on how 
ordinary Germans encountered Nazism and how everyday life became a crucial terrain 
of  ideological mobilization in ways that have forced us to think differently about how the 
Nazi regime functioned and how the most quotidian routines can become complicit with 
genocide in ways that serve as reminders of  the need to be vigilant in our own world. 
 Steege: I agree here with Dennis Sweeney. I also think that the study of   Alltagsgeschichte 
forces those of  us in the present to confront the disconnection between our habits of  
seeing and knowing about Nazi violence. The 2008 Academy Award season included a 
remarkable collection of  films depicting National Socialist Germany and its violence, 
but the degree to which these cinematic renditions — which aim, of  course, both to turn a 
profit and to accumulate awards for their seriousness — are comfortably familiar hint at 
how easy it is to  look at the violence of  the Nazi era. We remain safely voyeuristic, 
separated in space and time from the actions before us on the screen. This complacency 
is not restricted to our cinema-going. Jane Caplan challenges our easy willingness to see 
ourselves inevitably on the side of  the victims of  Nazi violence, for instance, in our 
assuming the identity of  victims at the United States Holocaust Museum.  Alltagsgeschichte 
helps historians to level a simultaneously accusatory and sympathetic gaze at its historical 
subjects because of  its willingness to direct that gaze to historians as historical actors, too. 
It takes seriously the particular historical location of  violence in the Third Reich and 
confronts what people saw and know. But  Alltagsgeschichte also acknowledges the ways in 
which that violence is not unfamiliar in our worlds, too. In a different historical and 
geographic context, Gyanendra Pandey explores the presence of  routine violence in 
South Asia, even as post-partition Indians comfortably assert their peaceful nature. 
Pandey argues that acknowledging the continuities of  violence in the present is vital if  we 
are successfully to grasp the implications of  the cataclysmic violence of  Partition. 2 Or, as 
Maja Zehfuss has recently argued, while the narratives we tell about violent pasts matter 
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for how we remember that history, they cannot be detached from the ethical decisions in 
the present that lay claim to their explanatory power. 3 
 Reuveni: Paul Steege makes an important point about the mediating position of  the 
historian between the past and present. The willingness of  historians to think of  
themselves as historical actors is not only a matter of  making the Third Reich relevant to 
their own present, but also asks historians to consider how their life experiences inform 
their approaches to that past. Placing the historian in  ‘ history ’ forces us to consider the 
impact on the writing of  German history of  their own very different living and working 
contexts, in the United States, Canada, Germany, Israel or Australia, for example. 
Growing up in Israel no doubt increased my awareness of  Jewish victimization. Much 
more difficult for me is to establish how my experience as an Israeli informs my 
understanding of  the Third Reich as a whole, and even more challenging for me is the 
question of  the relevance of  this history to our own reality today. 
 Steege: I don’t think we can talk about ordinary Germans as historical subjects without 
raising the problem of  responsibility. I count myself  among those historians who believe 
that ordinary people make their own history; but I am also convinced that this assertion 
does not relegate their history to some location  ‘ down below ’ , disconnected from the 
interpretative frameworks of  macrohistory. The question of  how to locate the everyday 
conceptually remains an ongoing dilemma, but asserting that  Alltagsgeschichte is either 
spatially constrained within a particular locality or microhistory, or chronologically 
expansive as part of  a timeless everyday-ness, reduces everyday life history to nothing 
more than a series of  narrative topics drawn from daily life. Critics in the 1980s worried 
that the exploration by historians of  everyday life in the Nazi period risked trivializing 
the crimes of  the Nazi era. In effect, they argued against looking at everyday life during 
the Third Reich, even suggesting that it dangerously historicized the Nazi period as 
harmlessly normal. In other words,  Alltagsgeschichte threatened to commit the same 
crimes, with admittedly different motivations, as the conservative polemicists whose 
appeals to normalize the Nazi past sparked the  Historikerstreit . 
 Jill Stephenson’s 2008 article in this journal offered a very different basis for concern. 
In her reading, the problem with  Alltagsgeschichte , especially as practised by a younger 
generation of  scholars in the United States, is not that it focuses on daily life, but rather 
that it makes the causal connections between that daily life and the Nazi programme of  
mass murder that we have been making here in this forum. For her, the danger lurks not 
in historicization but in  ‘ emotionally ’ charged assertions of  German collective guilt — the 
bogeyman by association not Ernst Nolte but Daniel Jonah Goldhagen. For me, the 
choices confronting historians of  everyday life, like those facing their historical subjects, 
are more finely drawn. Posing questions about ethical responsibility does not demand of  
historians that they render verdicts of  guilt or innocence. It is the questions that matter. 
Granting historical actors agency means that we historians must also attempt to articulate 
the choices they faced and the consequences of  their actions. That undertaking 
necessarily presents political and ethical challenges, not least to ourselves. 
  3  Wounds of Memory: The Politics of War in Germany (Cambridge, 2007). 
 Reuveni: A parable comes to mind: the well-known short story  ‘ Funes the Memorious ’ . 4 
Jorge Luis Borges tells the story of  a meeting between his fictional self  and a young man 
by the name of  Ireneo Funes who became hopelessly crippled in a horse-riding accident. 
After his fall from the horse, Funes perceived everything in full detail and remembered it 
all. Reflecting on this amazing aptitude, Borges maintains that, although Funes could 
record almost everything, he was nevertheless  ‘ not very capable of  thought ’ . To think, 
according to Borges,  ‘ is to forget a difference, to generalize, to abstract ’ . Borges observes: 
 ‘ In the overly replete world of  Funes there was nothing but details, almost contiguous 
details ’ . In dealing with the particular and the phenomenological richness of  human 
experience, there is indeed a risk of  becoming a kind of  Funes the Memorious, depicting 
the past as an endless ensemble of  adjacent details. This applies to all histories and not 
only to those working within the realm of   Alltagsgeschichte . 
 But  Alltagsgeschichte is far from being a mere reiteration of  the life stories of   ‘ ordinary ’ 
men and women. The main concern of   Alltagsgeschichte is meaning; thus it is engaged in 
the constant interplay between the particular and the general, exploring how historical 
forces are projected in people’s experiences, and how people form their historical 
conditions. More precisely,  Alltagsgeschichte is all about the act of  giving meaning, of  
 Sinngebung , not merely in the sense of  how we as historians make sense of  the past in 
relation to our own reality, but also how our subjects interpret their specific historical 
situation. In this respect, the apparent division between ordinary experience and history 
writ large is not inherent in  Alltagsgeschichte , and thus should not pose a problem to those 
practising it. 
 Sweeney: Picking up on what Paul Steege said earlier about the dangers of  a timeless 
everyday, we have to take care to avoid presuming that everyday practices are so deeply 
rooted that we imagine them as comprehensively structuring, widely embraced, 
unconsciously shared, or solidly anchored in long-term continuities of  routine. When 
pushed too far, this model of   habitus slights the more dynamic, volatile, fragmented, 
contradictory and multivalent ways that everyday life was being reconstituted in 
Germany across the twentieth century. A new analytical vocabulary — or different usages 
of  existing terms — that can accommodate the transitory nature of  the everyday, and 
what David Harvey has called  ‘ the compression of  time-space ’ , might be needed: that is, 
a historicization of  the everyday as a category of  experience in the  ‘ modern ’ world. 
 But returning to the relationship between microhistory and macrohistory, Henri 
Lefebvre might be able to help us out here in thinking about the spatial relationships 
within the everyday. If  we think of  everyday life as a series of  unique places, each with its 
own particular temporalities and routines historically specific to the modern era, surely 
we are better off  exploring them in their historical and constitutive inter-connections 
with other domains and practices associated with the economy, the public sphere, the 
state and so on. This perspective might prompt more discussion about how individuals 
are situated in these other social sites, how  Eigensinn is partially constituted  through them 
by inflecting or appropriating their resources and discourses, and how the everyday is 
always necessarily the site of  both individual self-assertion and colonization or 
governmentality. From this perspective, analysis of  the everyday experience of  ordinary 
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people and the mutually constitutive connections between the local, the quotidian, the 
public sphere, and the state might offer new ways of  understanding wider systemic 
processes and political transformations from the perspective of  the everyday. 
 Bergerson: I would like to interject here that I find Elissa Mailänder Koslov’s expression 
 ‘ on the ground ’ to be a preferable metaphor than  ‘ from above/from below ’ — which I am 
as guilty as any of  abusing. It still distinguishes the everyday from the traditional story of  
high politics but allows for what many of  you have been saying about our need to depict 
everyday life as an ambiguous space of  intersubjectivity, interpretation, and interpellation. 
 Sweeney: I would add to these categories a term such as ideology or discourse. Historians 
of  everyday life have been sceptical of  them and routinely try to look beyond them to find 
more authentic everyday concerns and struggles. They do this, however, by embracing 
unhelpful definitions of  ideology or discourse, which are usually thought to imply coherent 
systems of  ideas: blunt schemas that deny the everyday material needs of  historical actors 
or obscure the complexity of  everyday social interactions. But even ordinary Germans 
held to notions, if  sometimes not very coherent, ranging from the character of  social 
relations in the life world and how it should be organized, to more general understandings 
about what constituted legitimate or illegitimate authority, and even to political beliefs 
about what was just and fair in the distribution of  social goods — all of  which shaped their 
own sense of  immediate or personal needs. In order to pay more attention to these wider 
fields of  meaning, symbolic structures, connotative codes, cultural narratives or political 
languages in which ordinary people operated, historians could adjust the models proposed 
by Foucault, Bahktin and Althusser in such a way that discourse or ideology are seen as 
ensembles of  polyvalent and socially-constructed signifying practices. In this model, 
discourses are sites of  social struggle and thus susceptible to tactical redeployment. 
Historians of  everyday life have been using such models to reconstruct how individuals 
locate themselves in relation to wider structures of  thought, belief  and meaning, but they 
need to say more about how those individuals are also defined by those structures, 
embracing them as systems of  meaning, and acting on the basis of  them. 
 Bergerson: This makes sense to me. Ideologies need to be unpacked, but not put away. 
 Alltagsgeschichte , with its emphasis on everyday practices, can contribute a lot to that 
conversation because it is in those performances of  self  that the cultural meanings of  
 Sinngebung meet the social relations of   Sinnzusammenhang . But this thought brings me to a 
final question. Scholars study ordinary Germans using all sorts of  proxies: from what 
they said, wrote or remembered to their belongings, habits or photographs. But the self  
being discovered there is notoriously elusive — in the present and in retrospect, to others 
and even to itself. A major challenge for  Alltagsgeschichte lies in getting beyond ideological 
representations of  ordinary people to actual experiences of  the self. 
 6. What approaches do you find most productive for reconstructing the
experience of  selfhood? 
 Mailänder Koslov: Any lived experience is difficult to capture. It is constructed 
historically, as Joan Scott has pointed out, but not only through representation and 
language. There is also a pre-discursive reality directly felt through the body, as Christine 
Stansell has argued. 5 The experience of  genocide is even more challenging to reconstruct 
for the victims since we have very limited testimonies of  personal experience;  ‘ experience ’ 
in this context must be understood literally as survival first and foremost, even before we 
can begin to determine the many forms of  suffering, watching, tolerating, not conforming, 
brutalizing, and of  course dying that characterized everyday life under the SS. It is hard 
to get at the experience of  the gassed inmate or even the  ‘ muselman ’ , for instance, since 
survivors as well as guards had a complex and conflicted relationship with these other 
victims. Historians thus get only glimpses of  these experiences of  the Holocaust. 
From ego-documents of  guards or survivors, we get mostly self-representations and 
-presentations; from photographs and documentary evidence, we can perhaps 
reconstruct the material conditions in which people lived and worked, the organization 
of  space and time, hygiene and nutrition, and so on. The aim is to gain some insight into 
the experience of  everyday life by triangulating from the different types of  sources that 
we do have available to us. 
 Steege: Since the mid-1990s, historians have gained access to a growing array of  deeply 
 ‘ personal ’ perspectives on Nazi Germany, from Victor Klemperer’s invaluable diaries to 
the SS photo album from Auschwitz acquired by the US Holocaust Memorial Museum. 6 
These sources, and the question of  how to read them, present the historian with incredible 
opportunities but also quite distinct challenges. The best  Alltagsgeschichte makes that act of  
reading explicit. Historians of  everyday life wrestle not only with the nature of  this 
historical subject, but with our own place in the implications that we claim for them. 
Following Gideon Reuveni, we too participate in this act of   Sinngebung . By rejecting 
popular assertions of  a  ‘ normal ’ , ordinary life that exists independent of  historical events, 
the historian of  everyday life works to create moments where experiences of  the self  can 
flash up in bursts of  recognition. 
 Mailänder Koslov: Ultimately, historians only get glimpses of  the self. Our 
appreciation of  these experiences will necessarily stay fragmentary and inconsistent. But 
these very discrepancies can become part of  the analysis, showing a multilayered history 
behind the master narrative and the complexity of  human experience. Rudolf  Höß 
opened his autobiographical notes on his experience as the commander of  the Auschwitz-
Birkenau camp from 1940 to 1943 with the statement that Auschwitz,  ‘ was far away, 
back there in Poland ’ . Although that concentration and extermination camp was situated 
within the Polish territory of  Silesia which had been reannexed to the German Reich, 
the allusion to  ‘ far away Poland ’ is nevertheless suggestive of  how distinctly remote, 
inferior and foreign Poland was perceived to be, or rather, felt to be. 
 Steege: But we also need to be critical of  these depictions of  experience. Since most 
human lives were not contiguous with the twelve-year Third Reich, the claim to an 
ordinary life that extended before and after the Nazi era seems to offer people a respite 
from any totalizing assertion of  a Nazi subjectivity. Their ability to claim a continuous 
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normality of  daily existence that was not Nazi creates an impression that, within at least 
part of  their lives, they managed to resist the National Socialist regime. Yet the historian 
of  everyday life vigorously rejects any claim that this life,  ‘ lived [merely] through time ’ 
( Erlebnis for Walter Benjamin), served as an inoculation against complicity. By 
acknowledging the all-too-human reality of  complicity, and firm in the belief  that 
assertions of  broad complicity do not equal blanket condemnations à la Daniel Jonah 
Goldhagen, the historian of  everyday life also raises the bar on what constitutes resistance. 
At least since Martin Broszat articulated his concept of   Resistenz in the mid-1980s, 
historians have wrestled with the relationship between ends and means in everyday 
responses to and engagement with the Nazi regime. A decade later, Michael Geyer set a 
high definitional bar for resistance:  ‘ to refuse involvement in the violence of  the regime, 
to oppose the societies that tolerated it or thrived on it, and to destroy the powers that 
enforced it. ’ If  Nazi violence sought fundamentally to deny the subject status of  particular 
groups of  people, most notably Europe’s Jews, resistance and the history of  resistance 
ought to recover those subjects. The moral implication of  this last statement is intentional. 
 Alltagsgeschichte can succeed in its historical undertaking by retaining the  ‘ traces of  
violence ’ within and beyond the Nazi era. Catching sight of  these traces in the midst of  
everyday life offers historians the chance to realize a Benjaminian shock of  recognition, 
to recognize the humanity they share with their historical subjects. In such moments, 
 Alltagsgeschichte is resistance history. 
 Sweeney: The study of  subjectivity or identity, in my view, is an avenue of  research that 
holds the most potential for future work in  Alltagsgeschichte . Emphasizing self-determined 
acts of   Eigensinn , many historians of  everyday life tend to assume that there is already an 
autonomous self  operating as the witting or unwitting architect of  his or her own micro-
world or acting on outside forces in ways that shape the latter. As a consequence, they 
tend to assign a kind of  default identity to their subjects — as Germans, Berliners, and so 
on — without exploring the ways in which those identities were shaped, cultivated, 
experienced, undermined or mobilized. I think we really need to take more notice of  the 
many fundamental challenges to this figure of  the self-actualized historical actor in 
recent bodies of  theory and research and treat the self  as fragmentary due to the fact that 
it is perpetually the object and site of  political negotiation and performance. In this 
theoretical context, historians could also consider how everyday life as a mode of  
experience was called into being and then continually transformed or  ‘ colonized ’ by the 
new forces of   ‘ modernity ’ — the spatial transformations and transnational flows of  
economic exchange, the mass consumption of  commodities and visual spectacles, media 
and public communication, and the constant barrage of  political slogans and ideological 
discourses. In the context of  these efforts to redesign the everyday, subjectivities were 
often radically disrupted and disassembled, prompting ever more strenuous ideological 
efforts to reconstitute or resist them. 
 Reuveni: This critical re-evaluation of  categories of  selfhood should reassess the victims 
of  National Socialism. We commonly conceptualize  Alltagsgeschichte as perpetrator 
history, but how does it operate among the victims? In the historiography of  the 
Holocaust, the task of  reconstructing the life experiences of  the victims and establishing 
their agency has played a crucial role in the politics of  memory. Yet, while in the context 
of  the victims ’ history, the history of  everyday life does not seem to challenge memory or 
raise any ethical difficulties, it exposes a much broader spectrum of  victimhood and 
raises many challenging questions about the moral stance of  victims and act of  surviving. 
A case in point here is the question of  collaboration. In more recent survivor testimonies 
and historical representations the issue of  compliance is marginalized, but the survivors ’ 
discourse in the first decades after the Holocaust was haunted by discussions about 
collaboration. Hundreds of  trials in so-called Courts of  Honour in Displaced Persons 
camps, and twelve trials in Israeli courts — one of  which ended with a death sentence —
 attest to the significance of  the collaboration trope within the survivor community. A 
closer examination of  these trials — which still await a more systematic and comprehensive 
investigation — is likely to display survival at its most complex, and reveal the ambiguities 
of  selfhood in these contexts. It seems to me that  Alltagsgeschichte invites us to probe the 
limits of  such fundamental categories as perpetrator and victim — and to expose their 
ambivalence. Indeed, if  our aim is to produce a history that matters, we should be far 
more explicit about these fine differences. 
 Sweeney: This is why I think we should explore further the formation of  Nazi 
subjectivities more generally. This would involve taking seriously Nazism’s capacity to 
enter into the various realms of  everyday experience and private desires, including the 
domains of  work, quotidian sociability, family life, and consumer entertainment and 
spectacle. It would also, however, involve exploring the interpellative capacities of  Nazi 
ideology as it formed, or enabled the formation of, new fascist subjectivities, anchored in 
notions of  ethno-racial purity and self-contained  Eigenart , in response to competing 
notions of  self, the proliferation of  cultural difference, and the immediate presence of  
the other. By taking seriously the ways in which ordinary people imagined themselves as 
coherent subjects in relation to Nazism, we might address the larger and more disturbing 
questions, posed by scholars in many disciplines but never convincingly answered: how 
have the experiences of  everyday life in the (post)modern world — with its disintegrating, 
fragmenting and disruptive conditions of  social and cultural life — produced the 
conditions of  possibility for distinctively Nazi subjectivities? And why do radical right 
and fascist subjectivities seem to thrive under these conditions? 
